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“GIVE THEM A DAM BREAK!” PROTECTING THE NGÄBE 
BUGLÉ COMMUNITY OF PANAMA WITH CLEAN 
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM SAFEGUARDS TO PROMOTE 
CULTURALLY SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Cindy Campbell* 
INTRODUCTION 
Nestled along the banks of the Tabasará River is Panama’s largest 
indigenous community, the Ngäbe-Buglé 1  (pronounced naw-bey boog-
lay)2 who occupy one of the nation’s comarcas3 legally reserved to them 
by the government.4  For the most part, the Ngäbe live in the minimalist 
tradition of farming, fishing, and hunting.5 Their lives are simple and, like 
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1
 This indigenous community was originally known as the Guaymi and was also known as 
the Ngöbe who have a close affiliation with the Buglé. Together, this indigenous group is 
collectively known as the Ngäbe-Buglé. World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous 
Peoples - Panama : Guaymi (Ngöbe-Buglé), MINORITY RTS. GROUP INT’L, (Dec. 
2008), http://www.refworld.org/docid/49749cce1e.html (last visited May 14, 2014). 
[hereinafter World Directory].  
2
 Stephen Flohr, Eco-Tourism As Indigenous Resistance In Panama, WAGING 
NONVIOLENCE (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/eco-tourism-as-indigenous-resistance-in-
panama/(last visited May 14, 2014). 
3
 See World Directory, supra note 1 (stating that a comarca is an indigenous reserve); but 
see Stefanie Wickstrom, The Politics of Development in Indigenous Panama, 30 LATIN 
AM. PERSP. 43, 68 (2003), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3185059 (last visited 
May 14, 2014) (stating “reserves were granted before the concept of comarca came into 
being). 
4
 World Directory, supra note 1.  
5
 The Natives of Chiriqui: The History of the Ngobe-Bugle Tribe, THE AMBLER, 
http://amble.com/ambler/2011/08/the-natives-of-chiriqui-the-history-of-the-Ngöbe-bugle-
tribe/(last visited May 14, 2014). 
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other indigenous communities, their continued survival is inextricably tied 
to their land.6  
Recently disrupting their tranquil existence is the incessant sound 
of heavy machinery in the distance. The Ngäbe’s way of life is threatened 
by the ongoing construction of the Barro Blanco dam.7  This dam would 
displace the Ngäbe by threatening to flood several homes, schools, and 
farms.8  The free-flowing Tabasará with its abundant fish and crustaceans 
would be converted into a pool of standing water, breeding bacteria, 
mosquitos and, ultimately, disease.9  Unfortunately, Barro Blanco is only 
one in a series of many hydroelectric projects endangering the Ngäbe way 
of life.10 
As one of Latin America’s fastest-growing economies, Panama is 
moving forward with the Barro Blanco and similar hydroelectric projects to 
                                                     
6
 Randall S. Abate & Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Commonality Among Unique Indigenous 
Communities: An Introduction to Climate Change and Its Impacts on Indigenous People, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL REMEDIES 4 (2013) 
(quoting S. JAMES ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1 
(2009) (explaining that indigenous people include a diverse group of communities who 
are indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands on which they 
live, or would like to live, much more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of 
society living on the same lands or in close proximity. And they are peoples in that they 
comprise distinct communities within a continuity of existence and identity that links them 
to the communities, tribes, or nations of their ancestral past.).  
7
 Richard Arghiris, In Defence of the Rio Tabasara, INTERCONTINENTAL CRY, (Jun. 15, 
2011), http://intercontinentalcry.org/in-defence-of-the-rio-tabasara/ (last visited May 19, 
2014); see also Caterina Amicucci, et. al., Dire Straits: EIB Investments in Panama and 
Their Impacts on Indigenous Communities, Workers and the Environment, COUNTER 
BALANCE,  22 (May 2011), available at http://www.counterbalance-eib.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/PanamaReport_WEB.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014) (stating 
that the project would flood approximately 467 acres of land belonging to the Ngöbe-
Bugle). [hereinafter Dire Straits]. 
8
 Jennifer Kennedy, Tabasará River Communities Struggle to Halt Panamanian Dam 
Project, CORPWATCH, (Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15861 




 Id.; see also UN Representative on Indigenous Peoples Asked to Investigate Human 
Rights Violations Caused by Panama's Barro Blanco Dam, THE CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. 
LAW (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.ciel.org/Law_Communities/BarroBlanco_18Jun2013.html (last visited May 19, 
2014) [hereinafter UN Special Rapporteur] (discussing NGO’s urging the UN Special 
Rapporteur to investigate human rights violations as a result of the Barro Blanco dam).   
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meet the country’s rising demand for electricity.11 Consequently, the rights 
of the Ngäbe are a mere afterthought. 12  Although Panama expressed 
assurances that Ngäbe lands would be protected, portions of the land 
have already been expropriated for the development of the dam without 
the Ngäbe’s consent, contrary to Panamanian law.13 Indeed, by mid-2014 
the dam may be complete unless construction is halted.14 Specifically, Ley 
10 de 1997 and its progeny protect indigenous lands in Panama and 
prohibit such takings without the indigenous community’s consent. 
However, indigenous rights often take a back seat to Panama’s hunger for 
socioeconomic growth.15  
In addition to domestic protections, there are international laws that 
protect indigenous rights, such as the International Labour Organization 
Convention No. 169 (ILO 169) and the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP). The Barro Blanco project violates 
international law because the Ngäbe’s right to free, prior, and informed 
consent was not observed. 16  Despite these human rights violations, 
projects like the Barro Blanco are registered under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.17  While there are 
many organizations assisting the Ngäbe in fighting for their protections, 
construction of the Barro Blanco dam and other similar projects persists 
because there is no way for the indigenous community to formally register 
                                                     
11
 Nick Swyter, The Ngäbe Buglé: Panama’s Vocal Minority, THE PULITZER CTR. ON CRISIS 
REPORTING, (July 13, 2013), http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/central-america-panama-
ngäbe-buglé-barro-blanco-hydroelectric-dam-tabasará-river-infrastructure-sustainable 
(last visited May 19, 2014).  
12
 Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 45. 
13
 John Ahni Schertow, Panama: Indigenous Movement Deeply Concerned About the 
Barro Blanco Dam, INTERCONTINENTAL CRY, (May 7, 2011), 
https://intercontinentalcry.org/panama-indigenous-movement-deeply-concerned-about-
the-barro-blanco-dam/(last visited May 19, 2014).  
14
 Letter from Tania Arosemena Bodero, Dir. of Legal Affairs CIAM, et. al. to Mr. S. 
James Anaya, UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People (June 14, 
2013), available at  http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/ANAYA-
FINAL-FINAL-FINAL-LA2.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014)[ [hereinafter Letter]. 
15
 Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 45. 
16
 See generally Letter, supra note 14. 
17
 Registered as Project 3237 under the CDM. Project 3237: Barro Blanco Hydroelectric 
Power Plant Project, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,  
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/AENOR1261468057.59/view (last visited May 19, 2014) 
[hereinafter Project 3237]. 
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its complaints under the CDM because the CDM does allow public 
comments outside of the thirty-day comment period.18  
Part I of this article discusses the effects of hydroelectric power 
projects such as the Barro Blanco Dam on the Ngäbe. It examines how 
the Panamanian government’s exploitation of indigenous lands places the 
Ngäbe in jeopardy of losing significant portions of their territory to 
hydroelectric projects. It also explores the Panamanian government’s 
desire to increase its energy production through hydroelectric projects, the 
effects of these projects on indigenous communities, and the tension 
created by each party’s demands. Part II analyzes existing international 
and domestic protections for indigenous peoples and the failure of each to 
shield the Ngäbe from human rights violations; specifically, violation of 
their right to free, prior, and informed consent. Part III examines the 
CDM’s processes, its shortcomings with regard to the registration process, 
and how these deficiencies facilitate human rights violations.  
Part IV proposes three possible remedies to assist the Ngäbe. First, 
the existing CDM standards should be adjusted to predicate registration 
on current and continued compliance with indigenous human rights 
protections that comport with international and domestic law. Second, an 
access to justice mechanism should be established through which 
indigenous peoples and other affected parties can register complaints and 
report violations of CDM standards. Finally, Panama should embrace 
indigenous knowledge as a valuable instrument that could provide 
traditional solutions to contemporary problems. 
 
 
                                                     
18
 UN Special Rapporteur, supra note 10; see also Groups Support Challenge to Dam 
Project in Panama for Violating Indigenous Rights, THE CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW, (Aug. 
29, 2013), http://www.ciel.org/Law_Communities/BarroBlanco_29Aug2013.html (last 
visited May 14, 2014)(stating several NGO’s including The Center for International 
Environmental Law, Earthjustice, the Interamerican Association for Environmental 
Defense (AIDA), and Earthjustice, recently supported an amicus brief filed by the 
Environmental Advocacy Center, Panamá (CIAM) in the Panama Supreme Court of 
Justice arguing that the Ngäbe’s right to free, prior, and informed consent was violated 
when they were not adequately consulted regarding the Barro Blanco dam). 
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I. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CULTURAL TRADITION AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Ngäbe-Buglé are an indigenous community struggling for 
survival amidst the continued advancement of hydroelectric projects 
threatening to displace them from lands legally granted to them by the 
government of Panama. 19   While Panama’s need to produce its own 
electricity compels the government to find alternatives to meet this need,20 
the consequences of choosing hydroelectric projects to generate 
electricity imperil the land and culture of the Ngäbe community.21   
A. The Ngäbe-Buglé of Panama 
El Comarca Ngäbe-Buglé is located in western Panama and is 
comprised of lands from the Bocas Del Toro, Chiriquí, and Veraguas 
provinces. 22   The comarca’s creation was the result of a protracted 
political battle between the indigenous community and the Panamanian 
government. 23   The Ngäbe have lived in western Panama for 
approximately 500 years and during this time they consistently fought to 
have clearly demarcated boundaries to prevent intrusion, exploitation, or 
misappropriation of their lands. 24   Although the Ngäbe occupied a 
substantial portion of western Panama, cattle ranchers, coffee growers, 
                                                     
19
 Nick Swyter, Panama: Dam Promises or Dam Lies, THE PULITZER CTR. ON CRISIS 
REPORTING, (Aug.15, 2013), http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/central-america-panama-
ngäbe-buglé-indigenous-tribe-hydroelectric-dam-tabasará-river-company-genisa-barro-
blanco (last visited May 19, 2014). 
20
 Id.; see also Panama Seeks Solutions to Drought-Driven Energy Crisis, POWER 
ENGINEERING INT’L, (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.powerengineeringint.com/articles/2013/05/panama-seeks-solutions-to-
drought-driven-energy-crisis.html (last visited May 19, 2014). 
21
 Swyter, supra note 19. 
22
 Comarca Ngäbe Bugle, RECONTOUR S.A., 
http://reconturpanama.com/en/locations/comarca-Ngöbe-bugle (last visited May 14, 
2014). 
23
 See generally Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 55-58. 
24
 Fran del Rosario, This Land is Our Land: The Ngöbe Struggle for Land, 6 (Oct. 1, 
2011) (unpublished Independent Study Project) (on file with SIT Graduate Institute as 
Paper 1178), available at 
http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2197&context=isp_collection 
(last visited May 19, 2014).   
552 
 
and banana plantations gradually displaced the Ngäbe.25 In response, the 
Ngäbe mobilized as a collective unit to defend their lands.26  
Amidst a burgeoning movement that would reinforce the Ngäbe’s 
cultural identity and Latin America’s interest in fostering positive relations 
with its indigenous peoples, the Panamanian government took initial steps 
to further this interest.27 According to one author, “[f]or the first time in 
Panamanian history, the Panamanian Constitution of 1972 declared that 
indigenous lands must be given as property, and not under some type of 
usufruct arrangement.” 28  To that end, special laws established land 
rights—one for each indigenous group—governed by executive decree, 
creating an autonomous region, and giving the people freedom to control 
the use of their lands.29 Moreover, the Ngäbe—who had been protesting 
and petitioning for over 40 years—were finally granted a comarca, which 
was created by Panama Ley 10 de 1997 (Ley 10).30  
Ley 10 only granted the Ngäbe half of the land they requested,31 
leaving a significant portion of the people to live outside the territory.32  
The text of Ley 10 refers to additional lands that were supposed to be 
                                                     
25
 John R. Bort & Philip D. Young, The Ngöbe of Western Panama, in 123 ENDANGERED 
PEOPLES OF LATIN AMERICA: STRUGGLES TO SURVIVE AND THRIVE 123 (2001). 
26
 The Ngäbe organized in response to the teachings of Mama Chi, who emphasized the 
importance of traditional Ngäbe rituals and their unique cultural identity. Wickstrom, supra 
note 3, at 55-56.  
27
 Roque Roldán Ortega, Models for Recognizing Indigenous Land Rights in Latin 
America, WORLD BANK, (Oct. 2004), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GLOBALENVIRONMENTFACILITYGEFOPERATION
S/Resources/Publications-Presentations/Biopublication2005ModelsforRecognizing.pdf 
(last visited May 19, 2014). 
28
 Id. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a usufruct is the right of using and enjoying, 
usually for life, the property belonging to another. Thus, when the usufruct ended, the 
property would revert back to the original owner. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1684 (2009). 
This is an important distinction to make because the comarca status grants indigenous 




 Comarca Ngäbe-Buglé, COMARCANGOBEBUGLE.COM, 
http://comarcangobebugle.com/2011/03/the-comarca-Ngöbe-bugle/ (last visited May 19, 
2014); see also Wickstrom supra note 3, at 58 (stating the Ngöbe took measures such as 
marching and hunger strikes to gain the attention of the government and the general 
public).  
31
 The Ngöbe were granted a comarca for 650,000 hectares (or 1,495,000 acres).  
Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 50. 
32
 World Directory, supra note 1.  
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annexed to the Ngäbe-Buglé comarca; however, this has not been done.33  
Thus, the Ngäbe persist in seeking the legal demarcation of the annexed 
areas. 34  The significance of demarcation lies in the fact that as the 
government yields to pressure from speculators and investors wanting to 
develop and commercialize the area, the Ngäbe continue to suffer a 
constant loss of lands that were originally subject to annexation.35  
Despite having less land than originally intended, the Ngäbe 
continue to practice traditional subsistence survival, which includes slash-
and-burn agriculture.36 Their major produce includes corn, beans, rice, 
bananas, and root vegetables. 37 Slash-and-burn agriculture was a 
sustainable means of agriculture until the 1960s. 38  However, over the 
years, the Ngäbe population increased exponentially, further underscoring 
their need to protect the lands they have and to receive the lands 
promised them in Ley 10. 39  The growing population caused an 
intensification of the demand for agriculture. 40  Some Ngäbe turned to 
temporary labor outside the comarca to meet their needs, which 
undermines the Ngäbe’s communal agricultural practices.41  Culturally, the 
Ngäbe have a communal (collective) view of rights; thus to the Ngäbe, 
                                                     
33
 The Inspection Panel, Investigation Report of Panama: Land Administration Project 
(Loan No. 7045-PAN), WORLDBANK, xv (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/09/21/000350881
_20100921113336/Rendered/PDF/565650IPR0P0501S0RQ0091010and009104.pdf (last 
visited May 19 2014). 
34
 del Rosario, supra note 24, at 16. 
35
 Id.; see further discussion on Ley 10 infra Part II. 
36
 Bort & Young, supra note 25, at 124; “Slash-and-burn” farming is a form of shifting 
agriculture where the natural vegetation is cut down and burned as a method of clearing 
the land for cultivation. When the plot becomes infertile, the farmer moves to a new fresh 
plot.  This process is repeated over and over. “Slash-and-burn” is also known as 
“swidden” or “shifting” agriculture. What is Slash and Burn Farming?, RAINFOREST SAVER,  
http://www.rainforestsaver.org/what-slash-and-burn-farming (last visited May 14, 2014). 
37
 Bort & Young, supra note 25, at 124. 
38
 Id. at 127. 
39
 Resultados Finales Básicos, CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ 
INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y CENSO, 
http://www.contraloria.gob.pa/inec/Publicaciones/Publicaciones.aspx?ID_SUBCATEGOR
IA=59&ID_PUBLICACION=360&ID_IDIOMA=1&ID_CATEGORIA=13(last visited May 19, 
2014) (Click on “Cuadro 1”)  (showing that according to Panama’s census bureau, the 
Ngöbe totaled 72,450 in 1990, 110,0807 in 2000, and 156,747 in 2010).  
40
 See Bort & Young, supra note 25, at 127 (discussing the increased Ngäbe population). 
41
 Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 50. 
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collective rights come first and are held in higher esteem than individual 
rights.42 The significance of communal lands is best understood by the 
statement of one Ngöbe resident in response to land titling initiatives: 
“Ngöbe land is like a house. You cannot just sell your room without 
consulting your parents. However, a title gives you the right to do just 
that.”43 
In addition to agriculture, the Ngäbe also raise livestock.44  The 
Ngäbe depend on domestic animals such as cattle, pigs, and chicken. 
They supplement their diets by hunting and fishing.45  Varied species of 
fish and shrimp are very important sources of dietary protein for the Ngäbe 
people.46  The completion of the Barro Blanco dam would destroy the 
fragile ecosystem of the Tabasará River. In addition to flooding the nearby 
agriculture, the dam would destroy the population of migratory fish and the 
abundant shrimp found in the river.47  In fact, this dam would create a 
barrier with an entirely new reservoir lake resulting in an extremely 
different environment.48 
This is not the first time the Ngäbe have had to defend their lands 
from development projects. In fact, Barro Blanco is one of many 
hydroelectric projects to infringe on indigenous territory.49 In reviewing the 
                                                     
42








 Philip D. Young, Ngöbe Communities in the Vicinity of Proposed Chan 75 Hydroelectric 
Damn in Changuinola River, BURICA PRESS (Apr. 10, 2008), 
http://burica.wordpress.com/2008/04/10/ngobe-communities-in-the-vicinity-of-proposed-
chan-75-hydroelectric-damn-in-changuinola-river/ (last visited May 19, 2014).  
47
 Panama: Time Is Running Out For Tabasará Communities, RAINFOREST RESCUE (Mar. 
15, 2013), http://www.rainforest-rescue.org/news/4992/panama-time-is-running-out-for-
tabasara-communities (last visited May 19, 2014).  
48
 Dr. William O. McLarney, et. al., The Threat to Biodiversity and Ecosystem Function of 
Proposed Hydroelectric Dams in the La Amistad World Heritage Site, Panama And Costa 
Rica, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE COMM., 13 (Feb. 2010), available at 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/international/pdfs/UNESCO_PDF.pdf (last 
visited May 19, 2014).  
49
 Report from Werner Kiene, Compliance Review Panel Chairperson to Board of 
Executive Directors of the Inter-American Development Bank, 49 (Aug. 27, 2012) (on file 
with The Independent Consultation 
and Investigation Mechanism), available at http://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/Final-MICI-Report.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014). 
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boundaries of the Ngäbe-Buglé comarca, there are numerous plans 
affecting each of its three provincial locations, forming a collective of 
projects threatening to further shrink the Ngäbe living area. 50  In the 
Chiriqui province alone, there are at least nineteen dams that are either 
have built or are in progress.51 
In 1981, Panama authorized the development of Tabasara I, which 
would have been used to supply power to the Cerro Colorado Copper 
Mining Project.52 However, they eventually cancelled the project after the 
community through widespread opposition and protests rejected it.53 Later 
in 1997, a conglomerate organized to develop the Tabasará I and 
Tabasará II hydroelectric dams. 54  The communities surrounding the 
Tabasará River became aware of the project during the Environmental 
Impact Studies and quickly began to mobilize.55 In response, they created 
an indigenous resistance group, El Movimiento 10 de Abril (M10), to 
defend the Ngäbe’s rights and to stand against the building of a dam 
across the Tabasará.56 Ultimately, the Panamanian government cancelled 
the project, but the threat of dam construction in the area persisted. 






 Britnae Purdy, Ignoring FPIC Leads to 30 Years of Protest, Violence, and Profit-Loss in 
Panama, FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://firstpeoples.org/wp/tag/tabasara-river/ (last visited May 19, 2014); see also 
Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 50 (stating an abundance of copper was discovered under 
Cerro Colorado (part of Ngöbe lands) and after much exploration the government moved 





 Chronology of Events for Barro Blanco Dam (Panama), INT’L RIVERS, (May 2, 2013), 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/chronology-of-events-for-barro-blanco-dam-panama 




 Nick Swyter, Panama: The Indigenous Activists Who Paralyzed a Nation, PULITZER 
CTR. ON CRISIS REPORTING, (July 30, 2013), http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/central-
america-panama-comarca-ngäbe-buglé-barro-blanco-genisa-hydroelectric-dam-
tabasará-river-infrastructure-sustainable-indigenous-legal-activist-mine; see FAQ’s, 
GENISA, http://www.genisa.com.pa/en/faqs/ (last visited May 14, 2014) (addressing the 
suggestion that Barro Blanco is a revival of the Tabasara I project, but Generadora del 
Itsmo, S.A. (GENISA), the developer undertaking Barro Blanco project, denies this 
allegation and insists that Barro Blanco has no relation with the Tabasara I project); see 
also Chronology of Events for Barro Blanco Dam (Panama), supra note 54 (stating 
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The Ngäbe were also threatened with the completion of the 
Changuinola 1 (Chan 75) hydroelectric project planned in the Boca del 
Toro province on the Changuinola River.57 This particular project was the 
subject of ongoing litigation involving indigenous opposition and abuses of 
the Ngäbe people by the government and AES Corporation.58 The dam 
threatened to displace more than 1,000 Ngäbe people and destroy 
essential resources such as fish and shrimp, which would adversely affect 
the existence of certain wildlife. 59   The Ngäbe were also subject to 
numerous acts of violence, coercion, manipulation, and lies to advance 
the project.60  After numerous attempts to halt the project, Chan 75 was 
completed in 2011 and, as predicted, approximately 1,000 people (180 
Ngäbe families) were displaced.61 Though AES Corporation promised to 
resettle the affected indigenous communities prior to completion, the 
proposed resettlement communities have not been completed, leaving the 
families to live in poor facilities with no land to cultivate for their survival.62 
                                                                                                                                               
GENISA received funding for Barro Blanco from FMO of Netherlands, DEG of Germany, 
and EIB; however, GENISA withdrew its loan application from EIB due to mounting 
pressure on EIB from NGO’s and those funds were replaced by funding from Central 
American Bank of Economic Integration (CABEI)). 
57
 See ACD Comments on Changuinola 1 (Chan 75) Large Hydro Project (Panama), 
INTERCONTINENTAL CRY, http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/acd-comments-on-
changuinola-1-chan-75-large-hydro-project-panama-3157 (last visited May 14, 2014) 
[hereinafter ACD Comments].  
58
 Id. In fact, based on a report provided in 2009 by Professor James Anaya, U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People,  the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights asked the government to suspend the project during investigations, but the 
government disregarded this request. Jennifer Kennedy, Damming the Ngäbe: Aftermath 
of an AES Power Project in Panama, CORPWATCH, (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15788 (last visited May 19, 2014).   
59
 John Ahni Schertow, UN ‘Clean Development’ Money Sought for Dam That Threatens 
Indigenous People, INTERCONTINENTAL CRY, (Aug. 7, 2008), 
http://intercontinentalcry.org/un-clean-development-money-sought-for-dam-that-
threatens-indigenous-people/ (last visited May 19, 2014). 
60
 Id. Some abuses that occurred include residents being induced to sign fraudulent 
agreements that they did not understand since they were written in Spanish (a language 
that the majority of Ngäbe do not read or write), and as a result their farms were 
demolished. In addition, women, children, and the elderly were subject to acts of 
violence. Id. 
61
 Kennedy, supra note 58.  
62
 Id.; see also Participative Resettlement, AES CHANGUINOLA, 




Although the Ngäbe are not the only indigenous community to face 
this type of challenge, their land is uniquely vulnerable because of its 
history of repeated intrusion and appropriation by the government. 63  
Moreover, the continued advancement of hydroelectric projects threatens 
to consistently dimish the Ngäbe lands though the expropriation of 
portions of their territory, which the government deems necessary to 
accommodate these projects.64  Thus, it is imperative that projects like the 
Barro Blanco are prevented to preserve the Ngäbe territory and to 
preclude further diminution of their lands. 
B. Panama’s Quest for Modernization  
Panama is one of Latin America’s fastest-growing economies. 65  
Panama’s growth is being driven in part by construction of commercial and 
residential real estate flowing from an influx of foreign funding.66  With 
increased economic development comes a demand for power to support 
its growth. The demand for electricity stems predominantly from the 
commercial sector.67  For example, the expansion of the Panama Canal68 
is one such project that is pushing Panama close to the limits of its energy 
capacity. 69   Thus, in response to its increasing demand for energy, 
Panama has agreed to commence numerous hydroelectric power 
                                                                                                                                               
(discussing AES’s resettlement plans which failed to materialize in time to assist the 
indigenous communities). 
63
 See Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 49-50. 
64
 See Purdy, supra note 52. 
65
 Andres Oppenheimer, Andres Oppenheimer: Latin America’s Fastest-Growing 
Economies of 2013, MIAMI HERALD, (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/24/3362939/andres-oppenheimer-latin-
americas.html (last visited May 14, 2014).  
66




 See Ángel Ricardo Martínez, Panama: The Challenges Ahead, LATIN TRADE, (Feb. 13, 
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projects. In fact, hydroelectric power generates sixty percent of the 
nation’s electricity.70 
Hydroelectric power or hydropower is a mechanism that creates 
electricity through energy harvested from flowing water. 71   The most 
common source of hydropower is dams, which use the water flowing 
through its turbines to generate electricity.72 There has been consistent 
growth of Panama’s energy sector with hydropower playing a major role in 
its expansion.73 In fact, Panama has hydropower investments totaling one 
billion dollars with 95 percent of these projects located in the Chiriqui and 
Bocas del Toro provinces.74 Barro Blanco is one of many dams proposed 
by the Panamanian government.75  
While hydropower projects promise to deliver additional sources of 
clean energy amidst global climate change concerns, dams, in particular, 
have catastrophic effects on rivers, the neighboring area, and on the 
indigenous peoples residing there.76 According to the World Commission 
on Dams (WCD), “[d]ams transform landscapes and create risks of 
irreversible impacts.”77 WCD further noted that “the end of any dam project 
must be the sustainable improvement of human welfare. This means a 
significant advance of human development on a basis that is economically 
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viable, socially equitable, and environmentally sustainable.”78  Thus, dams 
invading and destroying indigenous lands cannot be said to achieve these 
ends completely.  
First, the obvious effects of dams on the basic dynamics of rivers 
cannot be overlooked. Free-flowing rivers are transformed into reservoirs 
containing stagnant water thereby changing the temperature, chemical, 
and physical composition of the water body. This essentially establishes a 
new body of water which hosts non-native species, and destabilizes the 
surrounding environmental community. 79   In addition, the river’s 
downstream areas experience some of the most devastating 
consequences since plants and wildlife can suffer a complete loss of 
irrigation and water availability. Also, since the dam holds back sediment 
used to replace the riverbeds downstream those areas are subject to 
erosion, thus reducing fish habitats.80  
Second, the negative impacts of dams on fish are also of 
paramount importance. According to the WCD, “detailed studies in North 
America indicate that dam construction is one of the major causes of 
freshwater species extinction.”81  As a physical barrier to movement, dams 
prevent the migration patterns of several species of fish that move 
upstream and downstream, like salmon and eels. Although mechanisms 
such as fish passes82 help to mitigate the damage caused by dams, they 
have been largely unsuccessful because the force of the current functions 
as a navigation device on which the fish rely to determine which direction 
they should travel. 83  As a result, dams also have severe social and 
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economic impacts on fisheries and communities such as the Ngäbe that 
depend exclusively on subsistence agriculture and fishing to survive.84  
Finally, indigenous groups who benefit the least from hydropower 
projects are disproportionately affected by the construction of dams.85  As 
a result of the sheer special requirements of such large-scale projects as 
dams, indigenous communities are largely physically displaced. 86  
Complete destruction of ancestral land further compounds the impact dam 
construction has on the indigenous way of life.87  Moreover, since many 
existing legal protections do little or nothing to preserve indigenous rights 
to land, such displacement can activate a legal domino effect that 
ultimately results in catastrophic results for indigenous communities who 
may or may not have legal title to their territories. 88   Considering the 
magnitude of damage caused by dams, the impending completion of 
Barro Blanco contributes to the Ngäbe’s mounting trepidation concerning 
the continued commencement of hydropower projects.89 
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UGvuLSXA&sig2=tIyDi53b8Pk-d3Gn31y6Ug (last visited May 19, 2014) (discussing the 
aftermath of the Byana hydroelectric built on Kuna lands in Panama, which flooded the 




Yet, in spite of the devastating effects of dams, hydropower 
continues to be Panama’s preferred means of generating electricity 
despite the availability of other sources of renewable energy. 90   In 
addition, according to one study, the Chiriquí province has the highest 
hydropower potential in Panama, which explains why developers so 
heavily target Ngäbe lands.91  In fact, hydropower projects have greatly 
exploited the area’s free-flowing rivers.92 According to one author, should 
Panama succeed in completing all proposed hydro projects, none of 
Panama’s rivers would be free flowing—all would be dammed.93 
II. EXISTING LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
International and domestic legal frameworks exist in Panama to 
protect indigenous lands from exploitation. The international conventions 
addressed in this article are the product of tireless efforts by various 
entities such as indigenous groups and NGO’s in promoting the idea of 
indigenous rights.94  In addition, domestic law recognizes the rights of 
indigenous communities’ collective ownership of land.95  Despite these 
protections, indigenous rights are often trampled when the interests of the 
State or developers conflict with these rights. 
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A. Indigenous Rights Protections in International Law  
There are two international law instruments dealing specifically with 
indigenous rights—The International Labour Organization Convention 
Number 169 on Indigenous and Tribal People, and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.96  These two sources 
provide valuable protections for indigenous communities. 
1. Panama’s Failure to Ratify International Labour 
Organization Convention No. 169 
International Labour Organization Convention Number 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal People (ILO 169) is “a legally binding international 
instrument open to ratification that deals specifically with the rights of 
indigenous and tribal peoples.”97  ILO 169 does not provide a definition of 
indigenous peoples, but it does provide criteria that are helpful in 
identifying the people ILO 169 protects.98  A revision of prior ILO 107, ILO 
169 recognizes the “aspirations of [indigenous] peoples to exercise control 
over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to 
maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions . . . ”99  
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Currently, there are twenty-two countries that have ratified ILO 169, and 
while Panama has promised to ratify ILO 169, to date it has not.100 
ILO 169’s predecessor, ILO 107, “was a first attempt to codify 
international obligations of States in respect [to] indigenous and tribal 
populations and was the first international convention on the subject[.]”101  
However, ILO 107 “contain[ed] a fundamental flaw” in that it refers to 
indigenous people as less advanced and that it promotes eventual 
integration of the indigenous into the society at large rather than promoting 
their right to self-determination.102  Although ILO 107 is no longer open to 
ratification, it remains in force in eighteen countries—including Panama—
until these countries ratify ILO 169.103  
One of the main differences between ILO 107 and ILO 169 is the 
overall view of indigenous peoples in each instrument. ILO 107 was 
developed with the understanding that indigenous communities were only 
temporary and would eventually be integrated into society at large.104  By 
contrast, ILO 169 was drafted with the idea that indigenous peoples are 
permanent societies and deserve communal lands. 105  This instrument 
posits that indigenous communities have a right to survival and to 
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determine their own progression. 106   Along with land rights, ILO 169 
recognizes the right of indigenous people to be engaged in decisions 
affecting their lands.107  Article 6 of ILO 169, which has been called the 
“heart of the convention,”108 provides,  
In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments 
shall: (a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate 
procedures and in particular through their representative 
institutions, whenever consideration is being given to 
legislative or administrative measures which may affect them 
directly; (b) establish means by which these peoples can 
freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors 
of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective 
institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible 
for policies and programmes which concern them; (c) 
establish means for the full development of these peoples' 
own institutions and initiatives, and in appropriate cases 
provide the resources necessary for this purpose. The 
consultations carried out in application of this Convention 
shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to 
the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement 
or consent to the proposed measures.109 
Under Article 6 of ILO 169, Panama would have a legal obligation to 
actively engage the Ngäbe in discussions regarding any projects affecting 
their comarca.  
Conversely, Article 12 of ILO 107, while acknowledging that people 
such as the Ngäbe may already occupy land identified for development 
and obligating the government to obtain free consent from the community 
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prior to removal, leaves room for the government to take the lands.110 It 
indicates instances where indigenous peoples may be removed without 
free consent, which includes if the displacement is in the interest of 
economic development. 111  Article 12 of ILO 107 further states that if 
indigenous peoples are removed from the lands, the country is obligated 
to either find them a suitable replacement or provide full compensation for 
the loss of land and any resulting injury.112 
While Article 12 of ILO 107 may appear to protect indigenous 
communities and provides suitable alternatives for their survival, it does 
not. It directly undermines their existence by presuming these people can 
simply be relocated to other areas.113 The term indigenous signifies that 
communities like the Ngäbe are spiritually connected to their lands 
because their ancestral roots are embedded in the land on which they live, 
which distinguishes them from the community at large.114 Thus, relocation 
is not an appropriate alternative given their inextricable connection to their 
land. Other significant provisions of ILO 169 further advance this 
understanding of indigenous and safeguard indigenous territories by 
acknowledging that indigenous people have the right to be actively 
engaged in any decision affecting their lands.115  
According to Professor S. James Anaya, United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, 
[A]n important advancement for the recognition of the rights 
of indigenous peoples would be the ratification of 
International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries. Panama is one of the few countries in Latin 
America that has not yet ratified the Convention. Convention 
No. 169 is an instrument that compliments the United 
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Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples . . . 
.116 
Given the tremendous benefit ILO 169 provides to indigenous peoples, 
ILO 169’s ratification would demonstrate Panama’s commitment to 
protecting its indigenous communities’ culture and right of self-
determination. 
2. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples 
In addition to ILO 169, indigenous peoples enjoy protections 
afforded by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP), which declares inter alia that states shall consult with 
and obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous 
communities before making any decision affecting their lands. 117  
“UNDRIP represents a shift away from th[e] [state-centered] approach [of 
indigenous rights], promoting a more inclusive and consultative 
relationship with indigenous people.”118  
This initiative to develop a system of safeguards specific to 
indigenous communities consumed over two decades of negotiation 
because states were wary of adopting new standards that would preserve 
an indigenous right of self-determination and be a key part of the decision-
making process concerning the use of their lands and the natural 
resources contained therein.119  Nevertheless, UNDRIP was adopted by 
the United Nations Human Rights Council in June 2006. 120  Unlike ILO 
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169, Panama is a signatory to this declaration and is bound by its 
terms.121 
One of the most controversial aspects of UNDRIP is the duty of the 
state to obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of the indigenous 
community before approving any project affecting their land or 
resources.122  According to one author, one of the reasons  
why these matters are deemed so sensitive is that, at 
present, one of the major threats to the physical and cultural 
survival of indigenous peoples lies in the increasing focus on 
so-called ‘under-developed regions which overlap with 
indigenous areas, in order to extract natural resources, 
establish industrial plants and build dams[.]”123  
For this reason, UNDRIP’s protections create a tension between 
the interest of indigenous peoples and the state’s interest in economic 
development.
124
  In fact, the concept of free, prior, and informed consent is 
pervasive throughout UNDRIP: “no relocation shall take place without free, 
prior, and informed consent;”125 “state shall consult and cooperate in good 
faith…in order to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent;”126 ”states 
shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples 
concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent 
process[.]”127  
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Free indicates that indigenous peoples must be free from force, 
coercion, intimidation, or manipulation by the government or company.128  
The term prior represents that the government must seek approval from 
the indigenous community prior to appropriating their land and prior to the 
commencement of any project affecting those lands.129  Informed signifies 
that the government must give the indigenous community all the 
information needed to make an informed decision. 130   In addition, the 
government must provide information in a language that they can 
understand, through means that they can readily employ, and include 
access to independent information and experts on law and technical 
issues.131 
While UNDRIP provides a powerful set of protections for 
indigenous peoples, unlike treaties which are binding on all its parties, 
U.N. Declarations are a type of soft law that are not legally binding.132  
Yet, while a state may not have a legally binding obligation, it is arguable 
that indigenous protections under UNDRIP may be considered customary 
international law, considering a substantial number of member states 
agree to its objectives.133  In addition, UNDRIP has tremendous support 
from member states, indigenous communities, and NGO’s who recognize 
the need for the human rights protections contained in the instrument.134  
For states like Panama who are signatories to UNDRIP, it also represents 
to the world a moral commitment to uphold the principles of the 
declaration.135  
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B. Panama’s Protections of Indigenous Rights  
Panama is recognized as having a superior legal framework of 
indigenous peoples’ protections.
136
  As compared to neighboring countries 
whose legal frameworks are still developing, as a general matter, 
Panama’s laws reflect a commitment to indigenous territorial ownership 
and autonomy. 137   However, even with a framework recognized as 
“innovative and effective, respectful of indigenous autonomy and 
supportive of community initiative,”138 Panama falls short by not ratifying 
ILO 169, a treaty that neighboring Costa Rica has already ratified.139 
Despite its commitment to indigenous peoples’ protections, 
Panama’s legal framework is nonetheless inadequate to ensure that 
indigenous rights are respected because Panama’s laws contain 
disparities between government authority over protected lands and 
indigenous rights to control their lands.140  Moreover, government conflict 
with indigenous peoples is commonplace.141  Enforcement of indigenous 
rights in Panama is weak, which allows the government to continue its 
abuses.142  In fact, the absence of enforcement coupled with the nation’s 
zealous pursuit of development enable the exploitation of indigenous 
lands and perpetuation of human rights abuses.143 By undermining the 
laws it established for indigenous protection, Panama has demonstrated 
indifference toward their indigenous communities, thereby contributing to 
the Ngäbe’s loss of territory. 
For example, while Ley 10’s passage was enormous step forward, 
additional lands were supposed to be annexed to the Ngäbe people at a 
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later time. 144  According to the text of Ley 10, the government was to 
demarcate these lands within two years of the law’s passage.145  To date, 
the lands have not been annexed to the Ngäbe people.146  In fact, while 
Ley 10 appears to grant the Ngäbe exclusive control over their land, 
controversy exists as to whether their authority extends to the natural 
resources located on the land.147  
Significant gaps in protection exist in Ley 10 because while the 
Ngäbe possess collective ownership of the land, the Panamanian 
government still retains the authority to authorize its use for purposes such 
as hydropower projects, thereby creating a usufructuary arrangement 
rather than a formal titling of land.148  However, Article 127 of the Panama 
Constitution guarantees land reservation to indigenous peoples of 
Panama to ensure their social and economic well-being.149 In addition, 
according to Article 48, there should be no expropriation of indigenous 
lands outside of special proceedings in a court of law.150 Thus, while the 
government has an interest in indigenous lands, that interest is, to a 
certain degree, subject to indigenous rights granted by the Panamanian 
government.  
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By contrast, subsequent legislation passed in Panama permits the 
government to exploit indigenous lands in favor of continued development. 
Further underscoring the severity of Panama’s indifference toward 
indigenous rights was the passage of Ley 18 de 2003, repealing key 
indigenous protections that existed in Panama Ley 41 de 1998 (Ley 41).151 
Ley 41, Panama’s General Environmental Law, contained critical 
safeguards for indigenous communities that mirrored the free, prior, and 
informed consent provisions present in ILO 169 and UNDRIP.  
However, Ley 41’s essential provisions—Articles 63, 96, 98, 101, 
and 102—were abolished by Ley 18 de 2003 leaving Panama’s 
indigenous people vulnerable to infringements on their land rights and 
right to self-determination.152  Article 63 of Ley 41 required indigenous 
participation in the protection and conservation of the comarca lands.153  
Article 96 provided that Panama’s environmental authority would consult 
with indigenous authorities on all matters concerning the environment and 
natural resources on their lands.154  Articles 98 and 101 reinforced the 
requirement of consultation with the appropriate indigenous authority 
concerning use of comarca lands for industrial or commercial purposes.155  
Article 102 stipulated that lands within the comarcas were inalienable, 
notwithstanding the traditional system of land conveyance within 
indigenous communities, and that the government can only remove 
indigenous peoples from their lands with their prior consent.156  Thus, the 
elimination of these critical provisions of Ley 41 in 2003 permitted 
concessions for projects like Barro Blanco to begin and signaled the 
continued expropriation of Ngäbe lands. 
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III. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL’S CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
 The hydropower projects mentioned in this article were initiated 
under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.
157
  
The CDM seeks to promote sustainable development; however, what was 
established to provide a sustainable solution to climate change has 
inadvertently created an environmental regulatory framework that leaves 
indigenous communities vulnerable to the objectives of host countries and 
developers.158 
A. The Clean Development Mechanism Framework  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was created in 1992 for states to collectively examine how 
best to mitigate the effects of climate change in the world.159 According to 
the UNFCCC, climate change is a serious problem requiring developed 
countries to take the lead in mitigating the effects of greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGs) by providing financial assistance to developing nations 
in their effort to lower GHGs.160 Structurally, the UNFCCC defines the 
convention’s fundamental objectives and divides countries into annexes 
based on the countries socio-economic status (Annex I and Non-Annex I 
Developing Nations).161  
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In 1997, responding to the deficiencies of provisions for emission 
reductions in the UNFCCC, the states adopted the Kyoto Protocol to 
strengthen the global response to climate change.162 Panama is a party to 
the Kyoto Protocol and is classified as a Non-Annex I developing 
country.163  The Kyoto Protocol is the vehicle through which the goals of 
the UNFCCC are realized. 164  “It commits industrialized countries to 
stabilize greenhouse gas emissions based on the principles of the 
Convention. The Convention itself only encourages countries to do so.”165  
Under the Kyoto Protocol countries are required to meet emissions 
reduction targets by pre-established “commitment periods” through any of 
three market-based mechanisms: International Emissions Trading, Joint 
Implementation, and Clean Development Mechanism.166  
The principle goals of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms are to  
stimulate sustainable development through technology 
transfer and investment, help countries with Kyoto 
commitments to meet their targets by reducing emissions or 
removing carbon from the atmosphere in other countries in a 
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cost-effective way, and to encourage the private sector and 
developing countries to contribute to emission reduction 
efforts.167  
These mechanisms have created what is known as the carbon market 
driven in part by the CDM, which involves “investment in sustainable 
projects that reduce emissions in developing countries.”168  
Created by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM allows 
countries with emission-reduction or emission-limitation mandates under 
the Kyoto Protocol to undertake an emission-reduction project in 
developing countries (like Panama).169 For every ton of carbon dioxide 
(CO2), the projects can earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits, 
which the countries can sell and also count towards meeting their targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol.170 In short, it forms a cap and trade system 
designed to encourage climate change mitigating projects in exchange for 
credit, thereby creating tangible assets with market value.171  
The Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol has full 
authority over and makes rules and regulations concerning the CDM.172  
An Executive Board supervises the CDM, and is responsible for 
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overseeing all activities related to the CDM.173  Although the Executive 
Board maintains separate panels to assist in CDM operations and 
ministerial functions, it remains fully accountable to the Conference of the 
Parties (COP).174  The CDM Modalities and Procedures, which govern the 
CDM, sets forth the rules and procedures by which the COP and 
Executive Board will approve and regulate CDM projects.175  
B. The CDM Project Cycle  
There are seven steps in the project cycle of a CDM initiative:    (1) 
project design preparation and submission of the proposed project;    (2) 
national approval from the host country; (3) validation from a private third-
party certifier; (4) registration of the project once accepted by the 
Executive Board; (5) monitoring actual emissions; (6) verification and 
certification that actual emissions reduction took place; and (7) issuing the 
CER credit.176  During steps one through four, the planning phase, the 
project participant must meet three substantive requirements for the 
Designated Operational Entity to submit the project to the Executive Board 
for registration—a letter of approval from the Designated National 
Authority of the host country,177 the Project Design Document;178 and a 
validation report from the Designated Operational Entity.179  
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The development of the Project Design Document requires certain 
information be included within the document and submitted to the 
Designated Operational Entity (DOE)—particularly, a description of the 
environmental impacts of the project and a summary of stakeholder 
comments.180  The CDM Modalities and Procedures require the project 
participants consult with stakeholders during the planning phase as part of 
the Project Design Document (PDD) and it must occur in order for a 
project to be validated.181  The manual specifies that project participants 
must request stakeholder comments, provide the stakeholder comments 
to the Executive Board, and include an explanation of how the project 
accounts for those comments.182 However, the manual does not specify 
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how the project participant should elicit stakeholder comments and what 
measures are sufficient to meet this requirement.183  
The stakeholder commenting period is thirty days from the date of 
the PDD’s posting on the CDM website. 184   During this brief period, 
indigenous peoples and other affected parties are required to voice their 
concerns or disapproval of the proposed project. 185   Yet, the project 
participant is only required to post the PDD in English, and there is no 
guarantee that indigenous people are even aware that the PDD is 
available for review since most, if not all, do not have access to the 
internet.186  
During validation, an independent evaluation of the project is 
measured against CDM requirements as set forth in the CDM Modalities 
and Procedures and any relevant Kyoto Protocol and Executive Board 
decisions. 187   Furthermore, the evaluator should verify, among other 
things, that the stakeholder consultation requirement was actually met.188  
Once validation is completed—and if the project complies with the CDM 
Modalities and Procedures—the Executive Board accepts the project and 
registers it as a CDM project.189  
The CDM Validation and Verification Manual requires the DOE to 
assess the steps taken by the developer to notify stakeholders, but it fails 
to provide explicit instruction to the DOE as to what steps are adequate 
and appropriate. 190  In fact, the manual indicates that the DOE must 
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determine whether the project participants invited stakeholder comments 
through document review and interviews when appropriate.191 However, 
the instructions are silent as to how far the DOE must go in making this 
determination since the manual also states that the DOE is not required to 
communicate with the stakeholders who comment; though, the DOE must 
account for their comments in its report.192  
After the project passes validation, it is then subject to ongoing 
monitoring of actual emissions and an additional verification, which is an 
independent review and determination that any GHG reductions are 
authentic; then, once verification is complete, the project is certified.193  To 
verify authenticity, the reviewer uses a combination of tools, which 
includes “conduct[ing] on-site inspections, as appropriate, that may 
comprise, inter alia, a review of performance records, interviews with 
project participants and local stakeholders . . . .”194 Although, the reviewer 
may contact local stakeholders, there is no requirement that they do 
because the main focus of this verification process is to ensure that 
carbon reductions occurred, not to ensure compliance with domestic and 
international law or to hear indigenous concerns regarding violation of 
their rights.195 Moreover, once a project is registered, there is no means to 
de-register a project that violates international or domestic law. 196  
Therefore, it is imperative that stakeholders have a voice early in the CDM 
project cycle to prevent a project that violates human rights from going 
forward.  
Once the project participant receives certification, they may then 
submit a request for issuance of the CER credit, which is also subject to 
an additional verification-type procedure. 197 Yet even within these 
processes, there is no assurance that indigenous voices will be heard. In 
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fact, the CDM project cycle does not contain a complaint mechanism, 
leaving a significant void for the defense of human rights.198 Although an 
appeals process currently exists, it is only open for the purpose of 
appealing denial of registration and is narrowly applied.199 The appeals 
process only extends to certain participants like the project developers 
and does not include indigenous groups or their advocates wanting to 
appeal the registration of a project for human rights violations. 200  
Consequently, once a project has officially been registered under the 
CDM, the possibility of indigenous voices being heard is effectively 
foreclosed without access to justice built into the project cycle. 
IV. PROPOSAL TO ENHANCE INDIGENOUS RIGHTS UNDER THE CDM 
Since domestic protections are weak and international protections 
have gone unheeded, adding enhanced accountability measures to the 
CDM Modalities and Procedures will help protect indigenous communities. 
Procedural safeguards can effectively mitigate the harm caused to 
indigenous peoples by placing roadblocks to registration if states and 
developers do not adhere to legal protections. Additionally, in order to 
provide a voice to the public at large, an access to justice mechanism 
available throughout the CDM project cycle would provide an additional 
layer of accountability that does not currently exist. Finally, the inclusion of 
indigenous knowledge during a project’s planning phase could provide 
valuable solutions thereby assisting the host country in meeting its needs 
while respecting indigenous rights.  
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A. Develop Validation, Verification, and Certification 
Safeguards 
The hydropower projects addressed in this article were registered 
under the CDM. While there are several factors at play when choosing a 
host country, the most important determinant should be the country’s 
mitigation potential as this forms the basis for the award of CER credits.201  
Nevertheless, as a small developing nation with relatively small mitigation 
potential, Panama has benefitted greatly from the CDM as an attractive 
host country because it has a very good investment climate.202  
In addition, the revenue generated by CDM-registered projects 
provides a major incentive to host countries such as Panama to 
aggressively advance hydropower projects like Barro Blanco.203  Despite 
the international and domestic protections discussed earlier in this article, 
Panama has disregarded the Ngäbe right of self-determination in favor of 
modernization by failing to adequately consult the Ngäbe regarding the 
Barro Blanco and other projects.204 Their actions have placed the Ngäbe 
in jeopardy of losing their land and culture; therefore, measures must be 
taken to strongly discourage any further expropriation of Ngäbe lands.205  
Contrary to UNDRIP, Panama failed to engage the Ngäbe with 
regard to the Barro Blanco project.206  According to an indigenous leader 
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of M10, the Ngäbe were not consulted about the Barro Blanco dam prior 
to its approval.207  Moreover, the Ngäbe were not invited to a public forum 
to discuss the dam. Of the people who were consulted, none was Ngäbe 
or even representatives of Ngäbe interests.208 Ngäbe resistance to these 
projects has often been met with violence from the local government.209  
The Barro Blanco and other hydroelectric projects (Tabasara I and Chan 
75) were all approved without prior consultation as required by 
UNDRIP.210 Thus, Panama failed to meet the standard of free, prior, and 
informed consent as set forth in UNDRIP and, as a result, the Ngäbe have 
suffered tremendously in furtherance of Barro Blanco’s construction.211 
To assist in preventing future human rights abuses, there are a few 
areas in the validation process where precautionary measures, if taken, 
would simultaneously preserve indigenous rights and provide economic 
feasibility to host countries and developers. First, mandating compliance 
with international and domestic law as a prerequisite for registration under 
the CDM would add a human rights dimension to the process that does 
not currently exist. This type of enhancement has been referred to as a 
rights-based approach to climate change mitigation and is strongly 
advocated for by top scholars.212 In fact, the World Bank has recognized 
the role human rights play in development and that their policies should 
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consider human rights as part of its decision-making process.213 Likewise, 
allowing human rights to inform the CDM approval process would make 
great strides in advancing the cause of indigenous peoples all over the 
world. 
As part of the planning phase of the project, DOE should be 
required to conduct an in-depth analysis of existing international and 
domestic laws implicated by the proposed project. This proposed review is 
similar to the DOE’s already-required review of the project against CDM 
requirements as set forth in the CDM Modalities and Procedures and any 
relevant Kyoto Protocol and Executive Board decisions.  
Conformity with international conventions and relevant domestic 
law is essential for indigenous communities to receive a meaningful 
opportunity to preserve their lands. It has been suggested that project 
developers include a statement that the project is not the subject of any 
adverse decision of domestic or international courts when submitting a 
project for validation.214  While this measure could make some impact on 
registration, by having project developers supply the information it places 
the burden on the participant—who has a pecuniary interest in registration 
of the project—rather than requiring this step to be included in the DOE’s 
independent review.  
Second, effectively defining the scope of stakeholder consultation 
would ensure that indigenous groups and other concerned parties such as 
NGO’s receive adequate consultation and have a meaningful opportunity 
to participate in any development affecting indigenous lands.215  The CDM 
Modalities & Procedures and the Validation and Verification Manual do not 
define the scope of stakeholder consultation with specificity; thus the lack 
of clearly delineated consultation procedures for such a significant and 
crucial step in the CDM process marks a blatant weakness in the 
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guidelines of the CDM that demands immediate consideration and 
revision.216  The lack of procedures governing stakeholder consultation 
essentially grants host countries and developers carte blanche in the CDM 
project cycle that stakeholders cannot challenge effectively because 
specific instructions for adequate stakeholder consultation do not exist. 
Conversely, host countries and developers are susceptible to ensuing 
litigation resulting from the absence of clear consultation guidelines.  
Finally, expanding the thirty-day stakeholder commenting period to 
include a notice period prior to commencement of the commenting period 
and requiring that project participants post PDD’s in the languages of the 
host country and affected indigenous communities would add an extra 
layer to the stakeholder consultation requirement prior to validation. 
Imposing a mandate requiring that project developers provide sufficient 
proof that affected stakeholders actually received notification would 
require project developers to employ more than one tool to adequately 
notify indigenous communities and their supporters of a potential project. 
Other means of contact should include hand delivery of the PDD to 
representatives of the indigenous community and notification by way of e-
mail and certified mail to supporting organizations. Additionally, failure to 
substantiate actual notice to affected stakeholders would halt validation, 
thereby placing another roadblock to registration until project developers 
comply. To developers, project suspension could result in increased 
construction charges and costly project delays; however, it also provides 
an important budgetary safeguard for developers as they receive some 
level of assurance that so long as they are in compliance their projects will 
not be hindered. 
B. Incorporate an Access to Justice Mechanism into the 
CDM Project Cycle  
In addition to adding more defined and closely scrutinized 
prerequisites to registration, there must also be access to justice for 
indigenous communities and other affected parties seeking to register 
complaints against CDM project participants who violate human rights. If 
human rights violations associated with a CDM project are disregarded 





pre-registration, post-registration, or at any point in the project cycle, 
under the current structure, indigenous peoples have no way to ensure 
that these violations will be addressed or that violators are subject to 
adverse action such as sanctions or de-registration of their projects.  
As previously discussed, Barro Blanco has already been registered 
under the CDM and, consequently, since the Ngäbe have no alternative 
means of recourse, they resorted to organized demonstrations to express 
their dissent, which has led to bloodshed and death when law 
enforcement acted to silence their outrage.217  Without a mechanism to 
register complaints, the CDM project cycle renders indigenous peoples 
like the Ngäbe vulnerable to human rights abuses because host countries 
and developers are free to continue their practices with no accountability 
or consequences for their actions. Several organizations have petitioned 
for this enhancement to the CDM project cycle and for revision of the CDM 
Modalities and Procedures to include access to justice, yet no affirmative 
measures have been taken to ensure that indigenous voices are heard 
post-registration.218 
Making continued registration contingent on continued compliance 
with international and domestic law provides a powerful backdrop of 
security for indigenous peoples so that communities like the Ngäbe would 
not be forced to resort to protests as their only avenue to voice 
complaints. In furtherance of the right of self-determination present in 
UNDRIP, it is essential that indigenous groups have unlimited access to 
opportunities to legally defend their rights when infringed upon by the 
government or other actors. 
C. Harnessing Indigenous Knowledge as a Means of 
Inclusion and Participation  
Indigenous peoples are known to be responsible stewards of their 
land, which “reflects a distinctive land ethic” separate from and superior to 
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the modern view of land as a commodity.219 Building on this environmental 
ethic, harnessing indigenous knowledge of the environment is a way in 
which states and developers can invite the participation of indigenous 
communities in land development projects that concern the nation’s 
population at large, while remaining sensitive to the surrounding 
indigenous culture and responsibly developing solutions to the nation’s 
problems.220  
While hydropower projects appear to alleviate Panama’s electricity 
concerns, they simultaneously destroy the surrounding ecosystem, 
displace indigenous communities, and have been initiated without 
indigenous consultation and consent, which severely undermines their 
right to self-determination. Additionally, though international and domestic 
law mandate respect for indigenous lands, indigenous rights in Panama 
have been outweighed by Panamanian interest in the Panama Canal’s 
expansion and other prospects of Panama’s continued modernization and 
economic prosperity.221 
Despite the popularity of hydropower in Panama, research has 
uncovered instances of indigenous knowledge contributing to the 
implementing of wind energy as an alternative to hydropower. 222  As 
repositories of environmental knowledge, indigenous communities in 
countries such as the United States have been able to work together with 
the government and developers to institute projects that would accomplish 
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the nation’s objectives while preserving the indigenous group’s culture and 
way of life.223 In fact, the Cree Nation of Canada created Voices from the 
Bay, an indigenous knowledge study, which memorializes in writing, 
indigenous environmental practices and is relayed to policy-makers and 
scientists as part of environmental assessments conducted in the area.224  
Initiatives advanced by indigenous groups have also received recognition 
and won prizes for innovation.225  Examples such as these are illustrative 
of the valuable contributions indigenous people add to climate change 
mitigation efforts because of their ancient connection to their land. 
Moreover, because of these connections, they are able to ensure their 
continued survival, thus preserving their culture.226  
In a recent report, Mr. S. James Anaya, United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, suggested that the 
inclusion of indigenous knowledge and enterprise furthers the indigenous 
right to self-determination by allowing the communities to determine the 
most beneficial means of development and management of natural 
resources.227  Accordingly, adding this dimension as a crucial part of the 
consultation process could produce thoughtful, innovative, and even 
traditional methods of resolving climate change mitigation issues. 
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Furthermore, inclusion of indigenous knowledge creates a partnership 
between the government and indigenous people that is mutually beneficial 
and sustainable.  
Environmental activist, Raúl Montenegro stated, “[i]ndigenous 
peoples living on their ancestral lands can help industrialized countries by 
living in a sustainable manner (not the contrary). If we destroy their 
environments and communities, we will lose the answers they have to 
solving our problems, and to the protection of our common futures.”228  
Adding the inclusion of indigenous knowledge to the stakeholder comment 
and participation period would demonstrate an intentional commitment of 
the international community to embracing human rights and environmental 
preservation as their core initiative. 
CONCLUSION 
The Ngäbe’s struggle with hydropower development is not an 
isolated problem; other developing nations have imperiled their indigenous 
in pursuit of modernization. However, the Ngäbe lands are consistently 
targeted for development to the extent that their collective lands have 
diminished over time, thereby threatening their continued survival. Despite 
this fact, Panama moves forward with a series of hydroelectric projects 
that will further reduce Ngäbe lands.  
Although ILO 169, UNDRIP, and domestic law mandate free, prior, 
and informed consent when making decisions concerning indigenous 
lands, Panama and Barro Blanco’s developers have disregarded this 
obligation since this project continues to be registered under the CDM. 
Thus, while international and domestic indigenous protections are 
paramount to establishing the rights of indigenous people, enhancing the 
CDM project cycle with procedural safeguards provides a fail-safe 
approach to protecting those rights and preserving indigenous culture.  
Specifically defining the scope of stakeholder consultation and 
expanding the thirty-day commenting period would give indigenous 
communities like the Ngäbe an equitable opportunity to voice any 
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concerns about or disagreement with a project affecting their territories. 
Moreover, access to justice must be available during the planning phase 
of the project. Indigenous people are fully capable of determining what is 
in their best interests for their continued survival. To that end, any project 
not achieving this goal must yield to indigenous rights so as not to trample 
them.  
Although this article advocates on behalf of indigenous peoples’ 
rights, the solutions proposed in this article would not benefit indigenous 
communities alone. Placing procedural safeguards early in the CDM 
process would allow developers and states to avoid cost overruns due to 
halted projects and costly litigation. Also, enhancing consultation and 
participation measures to include indigenous knowledge fosters a 
community of inclusion, mutual respect, and collaboration, ensuring 
climate change mitigation efforts are met in a responsible manner. 
Accordingly, these remedies would not only add increased credibility to 
the registration process, but would establish accountability measures that 
would safeguard human rights and ensure the viability of sustainable 
projects.  
